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The Story of Land 
Christina Mulligan* 
When we talk about property, why is land the default case?  The law 
recognizes a variety of exclusive rights in land, chattels, natural resources, 
and intellectual and virtual goods.  Increasingly, digital and otherwise intan-
gible objects are developing economic value and import that rival physical 
goods.  But despite this economic and legal reality, many property textbooks 
and academic articles continue to treat the notion of “property” as virtually 
synonymous with land and chattels. 
Julie Cohen’s recent article Property as Institutions for Resources takes 
to task the “despotic dominion” that the land-centric model of property holds 
over property thinking and scholarship.1  She draws attention to the reality 
that there is not one type of resource, but many, and recognizes that because 
the characteristics of resources differ in important ways, varied legal institu-
tions will be desirable to regulate and organize them.2  While there are “fam-
ily resemblances” among resources—qualities they have in common—Co-
hen argues there is no canonical case of property.3  Land is no more 
paradigmatic than patents, and real property law ought to be no more central 
to our thinking than other resource-regulating law.  As Cohen articulates in 
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1. Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from and for IP, 94 TEXAS 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2015).  
2. Id. at 4 (“One also must admit to coequal status as first-order forms of property law the 
various legal institutions that have evolved to manage those resources.”).  
3. Id. at 20 (“[M]y aim . . . is not theoretical purity, but rather usefulness.  Simply put, a theory 
of property as family resemblances provides a more useful foundation for understanding the types 
of rules and institutions through which existing systems of property perform their resource-coordi-
nation functions.”); id. at 32 (“Property rights are bundles of attributes constructed and assembled 
for particular purposes, and as such they exhibit systematic patterns.  It seems most sensible to 
understand ‘property’ as an umbrella term covering a set of institutional choices that are related by 
an emphasis on exclusivity and exchange.”). 
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her conclusion:  
Land is sufficiently different from intellectual goods that legal rules 
governing property in land should not be assumed to provide defini-
tive guidance about the design of IP institutions.  To the extent that 
real property offers such guidance, moreover, it is important to recog-
nize that natural resources law, corporate law, and the laws governing 
negotiable instruments also have important contributions to make to 
an account of IP’s functions and purposes.4 
Cohen is spot on.  And yet, as I read Property as Institutions for Re-
sources, I couldn’t shake the sense that real property law still has a central 
and critical role to play in the development of resource-governance law and 
institutions.  This comment investigates that instinct, exploring and rejecting 
a handful of reasons one might be tempted to embrace the idea of land as the 
canonical resource, and ultimately argues that land is best understood as a 
cultural touchstone for designing other resource-governance methods. 
I. Naïve Induction 
A believer in land’s canonical role might initially be drawn to a some-
what naïve, inductive-style reasoning about property law.  From this perspec-
tive, one might treat land as the “base case” of property,5 and reason induc-
tively from the case of land to decide what other kinds of resources should 
be “property.”6  Thus the question of “whether intellectual property is prop-
erty,” for example, could be informed by deciding how similar inventions 
and expressive works are to land.  And from there, if one decided that the 
objects of patent and copyright “were property,” one might then also con-
clude that the best way to design law about patents and copyrights would be 
for their law to mimic the law of land. 
Cohen’s article plainly exposes the underlying limitations of this kind 
of reasoning.  She further observes, “[I]f one moves away from the relatively 
narrow debate about whether IP is property and what guidance real property 
doctrine can supply, one rapidly discovers a literature about the design of IP 
entitlements . . . that is far more adventurous, methodologically speaking, 
than property scholarship proper.”7  The law of land does not necessarily in-
stantiate the platonic ideal of resource governance, particularly when the 
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goals underlying the management of different resources vary.8  Real property 
law does not even necessarily instantiate the ideal governance of real prop-
erty; indeed, few who have studied future estates would agree that real prop-
erty law has been perfected.9 
II.  Reasoning by Analogy 
A more nuanced approach to determining the role real property law 
should play in resource management could embrace the notion that the law 
of land does have something to teach us, not because land is special or more 
important, but because sometimes land does share particular characteristics 
with other resources that affect what governance model works well for those 
resources.  My own scholarship, for instance, has argued for more standard-
ization in how intellectual property rights can be divided, based on qualities 
intellectual property and physical property share.10  This “argument by anal-
ogy” approach posits that some resources should be governed like land, not 
because land is an ideal or is “more property-like,” but because the resource 
and land share a similar characteristic, and because a certain policy has 
seemed well-suited to addressing that characteristic in a real property con-
text.11 
Nonetheless, analogical reasoning doesn’t fully explain both the law and 
legal education’s near-obsession with the law of land.  Analogical reasoning 
may suggest that copyright law should be more like land law, but it equally 
could teach us lessons about how copyright should be more like water12 or 
securities.  Yet, these arguments appear less often in legal literature.  Land is 
the default point of comparison. 
III.  The Shoulders of Giants 
So why is land the example scholars and lawyers consistently return to?  
Another possibility is that land and chattel property are intuitive entry points 
to thinking about exclusive rights and resource control.  Land and chattels 
are concrete.  Most humans have a sense from their experience in the world 
of how ownership of physical objects might work.  And although one may 
gain facility in thinking about more abstract types of ownership with time 
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management scheme, which must mediate between competing and incommensurable uses.  Yet the 
natural resources analogy does not fully describe the ecologies of intellectual production and con-
sumption, either.”). 
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and effort, it is perhaps easiest to do this by tying those thoughts to something 
concrete and intuitive.  This may be the superficial reason that land law is 
prime: land is easier to begin studying than abstract objects.  It is checkers 
and not chess. 
But the notion that physical property is an intuitive starting place is not 
enough, without more, to explain the dominance of land in resource-govern-
ance thinking.  As children, we begin playing tic-tac-toe and hop scotch, but 
quickly move on to more challenging games.  In a similar manner, why 
shouldn’t we leave the study of land behind as new, provocative questions 
emerge? 
Isaac Newton famously wrote: “If I have seen further [than others,] it is 
by standing on [the] sho[u]lders of [g]iants.”13  The common law tradition 
allows legal practitioners and scholars to stand on the shoulders of jurists, 
legislators, and litigants who came before them.  And when it comes to re-
source governance, those thinkers historically grappled with the problems 
surrounding land.  For hundreds of years, disputes around land have occurred 
and were resolved.  We learned to differentiate good policy from bad by con-
sidering and deciding what made sense iteratively, in cases with similar, but 
nonidentical, fact patterns.  Real property law doesn’t always get it right, but 
it’s also not usually entirely wrong.  Like a wise, older relative, real property 
law has the benefit of experience. 
And just like a wise, older relative, real property law offers a certain 
kind of advice.  Relatives might not completely appreciate the context of a 
new problem, such as how to navigate social media interactions.  But none-
theless, they have had dozens of experiences relevant to resolving other social 
conflicts.  And from those experiences, they can often offer solutions and 
anticipate consequences that a newcomer would miss.  They can do this be-
cause they have been thinking about and resolving problems for a long time. 
Referencing real property law is like asking an experienced person for ad-
vice: by doing so, we see further than we would otherwise, because we stand 
on the shoulders of those who have considered similar problems before. 
But even the “shoulders of giants” perspective may not be quite enough 
to justify the “despotic dominion” of land in legal thinking.  As Cohen ex-
plains, some of the most “adventurous” scholarship has moved far away from 
the real property paradigm.14  Moreover, some scholars and lawyers abhor 
the substance of real property law.  Many believe the wisdom of the common 
law is overblown. And even when common law reasoning is convincing, it is 
sometimes only recent theoretical work that effectively takes a cut at explain-
ing why.15  The concise character of old cases often says little about the 
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thought processes involved.16  In short, while real property law is sometimes 
wise, it can also be incredibly unhelpful.  Why “stand on the shoulders” of 
such a rickety foundation? 
IV.  The Remix 
A final perspective on the potential role of real property law is as the 
fodder for remixing legal rules—a necessary starting point from which to 
develop law further.  Quoting Candice Breitz, Larry Lessig explains in his 
book Remix that culture is not and cannot be created in a vacuum.17  In Free 
Culture, he similarly argues: “Creators here and everywhere are always and 
at all times building upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds 
them now.”18  The Odyssey informs stories about journeys.  Cinderella in-
forms rags-to-riches narratives.  And just as culture can’t occur in a vacuum, 
neither can law.  Real property law informs resource management.  Even 
when we reject the relevance of real property law to a new situation, our 
choices are often made in the context of rejecting the land-related norm, ra-
ther than justifying our positions without an anchor. 
Real property law is the archetypal fairy tale, the recurring theme of 
property jurisprudence.  When different types of resources are in play, we 
often deviate from the rules governing real property, and we should.  But 
those deviations don’t occur in isolation.  Even when the law of intellectual 
property, of water and oil, of air, deviates from the law of land, it does so 
because of real property law, not despite it.  As discussed above, scholars 
often look at why real property law developed a certain rule or practice and 
ask whether the resource in question shares the relevant qualities with land.  
If it does, that often indicates that we should consider extending the rule for 
land to the law of the new resource.  We can look at cases and analysis and 
determine whether the rule effectively addresses the problem or goal in ques-
tion.  We can gauge whether it is a good rule by looking at the effect the rule 
has had on land.  In the alternative case, having dissimilar qualities to land 
might indicate a need to deviate from established practice.  In either situation, 
there is a pull to make these judgments in light of the context—the real prop-
erty jurisprudence that developed in the past. 
Put in other words, real property law plays the role in law that Shake-
speare, Grimms, and Homer play in culture.  It is a common cultural touch-
point.  Real property law has themes that, because of its longevity and omni-
presence, have been explored and revised and re-keyed many times.  And like 
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17. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
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the stories of Romeo and Juliet, Cinderella, and Odysseus, the themes of real 
property law help us understand later problems and conflicts.  The teenagers 
in West Side Story lived in a world with different conflicts, culture, values, 
and technology than the protagonists of Romeo and Juliet.  But we under-
stand West Side Story better because we already grasp the futility of the con-
flict in Romeo and Juliet.  Real property law has the same potential to inform 
the law of new resources. 
V.  Questioning and Embracing the Narrative 
Just as it is worth asking why certain authors and stories are read in 
English and history classes, it is equally appropriate to ask whether real prop-
erty law should be the center of our story of resources.  But there are several 
reasons to think land should have a major role to play in the future, because 
of its prominent role in our past.  As Jack Balkin observes: 
We understand ourselves in terms of stories about who we are and how 
we came to be.  These stories help us understand the situation we are 
currently facing and the way we should respond to it. . . . The stories 
we tell about ourselves are full of normative lessons: They explain 
who we are, where we came from, what we have done . . . what we 
said we must never let happen again, and what we said we must make 
happen again . . . .19  
Real property law is the story of how we managed resources in the past.  
Whether we embrace or reject that law in the future, real property law will be 
part of those decisions.  The literal centuries of solving land-related problems 
have begotten a set of tools and frameworks, albeit incomplete, from which 
to consider the problems associated with creating law for other types of re-
sources.  Unanticipated and unlikely fact patterns have had time to occur, to 
force judges and scholars to think hard about what property law is and should 
be doing.  Due to its age and scope, real property law is a giant for us to stand 
on, a rich corpus of both wise decisions and horrible mistakes that we can 
grapple with and respond to.  Ideally, it will help us decide who we are and 
where we want to go. 
 
19. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 26 (2011). 
